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Abstract - Embedded systems are an established part of life. 
Their security requirements underline the importance of 
properly formulated, implemented, and enforced security 
policies throughout their life-cycle. Currently, security is just 
an afterthought, and most solutions are meant to thwart 
particular attacks. However, the increasing number of security 
breaches, the ensuing economical losses, and potential 
dangers all emphasize the importance of fundamental security 
solutions. This paper first surveys the current situation and 
then proposes a holistic approach where security is 
considered from the beginning of the design of embedded 
systems throughout their entire life-cycle. In our approach, the 
entire system life-cycle is analyzed and appropriate 
countermeasures are incorporated in the design. Obviously, 
prevention is not the complete solution. A 4-level defense 
strategy assures not only that a system has been properly 
designed in terms of security, but also that the liabilities of its 
designers are adequately covered. 




  The idea of pervasive computing is growing and 
computing devices will be available anywhere and anytime. 
Our lives and our businesses depend unavoidably on 
computing systems and, increasingly, on embedded systems in 
particular. In this paper, our focus is on embedded systems, 
which are ubiquitously used to sense, capture, store, process, 
transmit personal, private and vital data. When an embedded 
system performs any of these tasks, security observation is a 
necessity. Moreover, security of embedded systems provides 
new business opportunities and prevents losing many 
opportunities. For example, it prevents safety disasters and 
should help preserving user privacy. Time limited services or 
on-demand digital services are examples of new business 
opportunities benefiting from well established secure 
embedded devices. The increasing number of security breaches 
which have been detected in embedded systems in recent years 
also reveals the importance of fundamental security solutions. 
Current solutions are mostly the addition of features, such as 
specific cryptographic algorithms and security protocols to the 
system. This is mostly done at the end of the design phase or 
only as addition to a part of the system, such as the transceiver 
part of the system to encrypt and decrypt outgoing and 
incoming data. In fact, solutions of this sort are comparable to 
‘patching’ a system. They cannot result in a complete solution 
and are often not integrated into the entire system. Sometimes 
these solutions violate the criteria that designers have taken 
into consideration from the beginning. These are subtle points 
that are not addressed by designers who tend to focus mainly 
on functionality and by companies that tend to focus on short 
term profits. 
 In this paper we set out to have a comprehensive view on 
the security of embedded systems and propose a design 
methodology that can help designers and developers to deliver 
more secure systems. To clarify what embedded systems are, 
we provide an informal definition of embedded systems. This 
also explains what distinguishes them that we must consider 
their security as a special case.  A definition of security also 
helps to know when a system is considered secure and what 
should be done to make it secure. In the following paragraphs, 
several definitions are provided that are used in the rest of the 
paper.   
1.1 Embedded systems 
 Embedded systems are specialized electronic systems that 
are part of a larger system. They are normally not directly 
visible to the user [1]. Examples of embedded systems are 
computing systems, which are inside, for instance, 
automobiles, planes, trains, space vehicles, consumer 
electronics, medical equipments, vending machines, network 
appliances, smart cards, cell phones, PDAs and other 
handhelds as well as robots and toys. They are designed and 
developed for a specific application and not as general purpose 
computing devices. They play a significant role in areas such 
as education, health care, ambient intelligence, consumer 
electronics, avionics, car industry, and controllers in industrial 
plants. The uses are endless, and their number is increasing in 
our new world of pervasive computing. Embedded systems 
have common characteristics such as: They should be efficient 
in terms of criteria such as power consumption, size, run-time 
requirements, weight, and cost. Also they are often embedded 
in portable systems with network capabilities. 
1.2 Computing Systems Security 
 Computer security is the protection of computing systems 
against threats to confidentiality, integrity and availability [2]. 
In other words, a secure computing system provides three 
properties: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. All three 
are essential but depending on the application of system, one 
or two of them may receive more attention. Confidentiality 
means that information is disclosed only according to a 
security policy. Integrity means that information or system 
structure can be changed according to a security policy and 
availability means that services of system are available 
according to a security policy. The security policy addresses 
constraints on functions, flow among functions and constraints 
on users’ access. Constraints on function and access may be 
correlated with time, location and/or other parameters. Users 
are external systems or human users. All of the details about 
users and constraints is explained precisely in a security 
policy.  
1.3 Security model and definitions 
 Vulnerability, threat, attack and safeguard or 
countermeasures make up a framework that enables arguing 
about computer security. Vulnerability is some weakness or 
fault in the system that could allow security to be violated. A 
threat is a circumstance or event that could cause harm by 
violating security. An adversary exploits a vulnerability in the 
system to perform an attack. A safeguard is any technique, 
procedure, or other measure that reduces vulnerability. 
Safeguards make threats weaker or less likely. This framework 
─vulnerability, threat, attack and safeguard─ is useful for 
analyzing and evaluating system security, also for deciding 
what safeguards to use [2]. 
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section  2 
argues why the security of embedded devices is important and 
in section  3 challenges in designing secure embedded systems 
are presented. In section  4, it is discussed why security is 
treated as an afterthought. In a system, different stakeholders 
may have different security expectations. This is discussed 
with an example in section  5. In section  6, a holistic approach 
is proposed in which, by studying the system life-cycle, 
vulnerabilities are predicted and their countermeasures are 
applied during the system design. Since the complete behavior 
of the system cannot be predicted, all threats and attacks 
cannot be prevented. In section  7 a 4-level defense is described 
that assures a system has been properly designed in terms of 
security and may be expected not to pose a security hazard. 
2 Why Embedded Security  
 Making embedded systems secure is not only to protect 
resources and assets; it also provides opportunities for new 
services and new businesses. In [3] it is argued why the 
security of embedded systems is important. More arguments 
are listed here that emphasize the significance of embedded 
systems security. 
Pervasive security 
Embedded systems are becoming pervasive as they are 
becoming cheaper. Their networking degree also is growing to 
let them have a better synergy by sharing resources and 
connecting users. They also contain assets of different 
stakeholders. Networking, sharing resources and holding 
assets exposes embedded systems to a growing range of 
threats. 
New look 
In the past decades a lot of research has been carried out in the 
area of information security and system security. Many mature 
and well studied solutions exist. Some of the solutions are 
applicable to embedded systems but some of them cannot be 
utilized. The common characteristics of embedded systems 
─mobile and resource constrained systems─ enforce 
researchers to take a new look at current solutions. For 
example, security solutions that consider the life-cycle of 
software do not consider the disposal phase as we would do in 
embedded systems because software does not have a disposal 
phase. 
Safety 
Application of embedded systems in areas such as health care, 
avionics, or car industry where humans are involved raises the 
issue of safety. For example, the violation of integrity and 
availability of an artificial hearth, brake of a car and navigation 
system of an airplane may have disastrous consequences [4]. 
Attacks are turning from digital-data attacks to human attacks. 
Financials
M-commerce is followed by e-commerce, where mobile 
devices are the main player in financial transactions. Smart 
cards with e-wallet function or micropayments are examples of 
embedded systems in finance. There is enough incentive to 
break into these systems and there is high benefit for financial 
institutes to protect their systems. 
New business model 
There will be many new applications or business models that 
strongly depend on the security techniques of embedded 
systems e.g., pay-TV, video on demand or time-limited 
services. Investors will invest in these businesses when they 
are sure their revenue is properly protected. 
Privacy 
Some embedded systems are able to sense and capture a huge 
amount of data about location or status of a user to provide 
them some services. For example GPS systems process a lot of 
data about whereabouts of a user. By this information the 
location and personal information of a user can be observed 
easily which may affect the user’s privacy.  
Legal issues 
Some applications have legal concerns, e.g., e-voting or road-
toll systems. They should meet applicable governmental 
standards to be acceptable for usage. They should not be 
manipulated easily. Producers should implement sound 
security techniques in their products to receive approval from 
authorities. 
Secure identification of components 
Third parties will contribute components and subsystems to a 
system. The secure identification of them is a major concern 
for a large number of applications. Counterfeiting products and 
parts (e.g. printer cartridges and ICs) are areas with urgent 
need for strong and secure device identification. Also, secure 
identification is important for access control. 
Light-weight crypto 
Since resources are limited in embedded systems, some of the 
current security solutions are not applicable. New security 
solutions with less computational requirements, smaller size 
and lower energy consumption are necessary. 
3 Embedded Security Challenges 
 Designing secure embedded systems is not 
straightforward. There are many challenges that should be 
defied in order to secure them. Some of the challenges are 
explained below. 
Heterogeneity 
Most embedded systems are heterogeneous. They include 
software, hardware, mechanical components, optics, etc., and 
may consist of different components based on different 
technologies. Securing a heterogeneous system may be more 
challenging than a homogeneous system. 
Complexity 
Embedded systems have constraints which make the 
application of general security solutions difficult or 
impossible. Integrating security mechanisms with other 
functionality requirements is also not straightforward. Some 
embedded systems have real-time requirements, low power 
considerations and reliability requirements that should be 
considered besides security requirements. In fact, security is 
now a new metric that should be considered besides the other 
metrics. Meanwhile, security policies may violate other 
parameters [5]. These issues make security of embedded 
systems complicated. 
Flexibility 
Personalization of a system is a desirable feature for users. 
This implies provision of some flexibility and ability of 
customization in the system. On the other hand, this flexibility 
may impact the security of a system. It is challenging to find 
an equilibrium point of flexibility and security in a system. 
Also, it is desirable to have a flexible security policy in the 
system. Since security utilizes resources, in some 
environments we prefer to reduce the level of security to save 
resources. 
Decentralized control 
Not all embedded systems are controlled centrally; some of 
them are working independently. In some situations 
maintaining, repairing or restoration of them is done remotely. 
Some have adaptive behaviors in different environments. 
These systems will communicate and interact in ways that 
were unforeseen during their design. In these scenarios, there 
should be self-adaptive, self-configuring or self-restoring 
techniques to preserve security. 
Alternative energy sources 
Side channel attacks are strong attacks based on information 
gained from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem, 
e.g., power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, timing 
information, or even sound [6, 7]. These can provide an extra 
source of information which can be exploited to attack the 
system. These attacks and their countermeasures have been 
studied for a long time [8]. Introduction of alternative energy 
sources e.g., light, vibration, walking, etc. might introduce new 
types of side channel attacks. 
Time-to-market 
The first product that reaches the market is the winner. Time-
to-market is a criterion that forces producers to prevent 
applying well studied security solutions. In this case, producers 
emphasize more on legal enforcements. Security solutions 
which will not cause a delay in time-to-market are essential 
and valuable for producers. 
Security Cost 
Security needs more management which leads to higher costs. 
Having cheap security solutions would make systems more 
secure, since manufacturers avoid utilizing costly solutions. 
They prefer to add more functionality than securing current 
functionalities. Affordable security mechanisms are 
demanding. 
 We explained the importance of the security of embedded 
devices, and existing challenges. Current solutions are mostly 
as an afterthought and the security is not considered from the 
beginning. In the next section, it is discussed why security is 
an afterthought. 
4 Security: an Afterthought 
 The software industry and embedded device developers 
rarely think about security from the beginning. Security is 
usually an afterthought because the primary consideration of 
producers and consumers is not security. Companies pay more 
attention to: Sending the product to the market as soon as 
possible; Producing a user friendly product; A product with 
more features that competes better in the market than a more 
secure product; Massive production for more income and a 
cheaper device. 
 Since security affects all of the above considerations it is 
not an economic priority for companies. Meanwhile, at the 
moment, security is also not a primary consideration for all 
users. Most users pay more attention to: Saving money; Ease 
of use, features and functionalities. Hence companies know 
there is no immediate return by making their product secure. 
They have little incentive if the consumer does not consider it 
to be important. Moreover most consumers do not know the 
difference between a secure product and an insecure one 
before purchase. They are more interested in the technologies 
that solve their problem in the short term and if they want to 
opt for more secure technologies, then companies discourage 
them by higher prices. However, producers and consumers will 
worry about security of their product when they lose their 
assets by a breach of their device. As more news of security 
breaches and hacks are reported, the awareness and importance 
of security is raised. The best comprehensive solution is 
considering the security from the beginning and throughout the 
life-cycle of the system. In next sections, this approach is 
explained in detail. 
5 Security Expectations from a System 
 The first step in designing a secure embedded system is 
its security analysis. For security analysis of a system, all the 
resources that should be protected are specified. Also all 
stakeholders, both for and against the system should be 
identified. In fact, whoever has an asset in a system has a 
security requirement for it and whoever interacts with the 
system could be a potential adversary of part or the entire 
system. Different stakeholders have different expectations 
from the security of a system. 
 With an example, we explain how different stakeholders 
are concerned about the security of a system. We suppose a 
taxi agency that owns some cars and several drivers working 
for them. Also we suppose the cars in this agency are all 
modern cars equipped with the latest electronics. 
• User: entities that use services of a system. In our example, 
a driver is a user of system. For safety reasons, the 
availability of computing parts of the car and the location 
privacy of the driver are some of driver’s security concerns. 
• Owner: entities that have ownership of a system. Owner 
can be the user of system or they may be separate entities. 
In our example, the taxi agency is the owner. The agency 
may record some information on the car, the confidentiality 
and integrity of which is important for them. Except agency 
nobody else even the driver of car should have access to 
that information. 
• Manufacturer: entities that produce or manufacture the 
system. Car manufacturers design some components for the 
car and it is their intellectual property. The confidentiality 
and integrity of their design, their code and non-forgeability 
of components are their concern. 
• Repairer or component provider: entities that maintain or 
repair the system. This entity can be the manufacturer itself 
or they may be two separate entities. If the car should be 
repaired or transferred for updating of some parts or for 
safety control, a repairer should not have access to the 
information of the driver or owner. Meanwhile, maintainer 
may add some components or codes that are their 
intellectual property. 
• Platform provider: entities that provide the infrastructure or 
specialized services to the system such as network facilities, 
communication links, power sources, etc. Future cars can 
communicate with each other and forward safety messages. 
They can also receive information from road side 
equipment. Such wireless platforms help cars to operate 
safely, so the availability of such platforms is important. 
Integrity and confidentiality of messages communicated by 
cars or road side equipment over these platforms are also a 
concern. 
• Service provider: entities that provide some services to the 
end user or to the owner, such as infotainment or games, 
etc. Cars can download music, movies or games on their 
media player and DRM is an issue that infotainment 
providers worry about. 
• Dealer: entities that act between manufacturer and end 
users or between two users. Sometimes a dealer is just a 
middleman who delivers a system to the user. A dealer may 
store some information on a car that should be kept 
confidential. Some information is not confidential to 
manufacturer or user but a dealer should not have access to 
them. Integrity and confidentiality of information stored on 
the device by the manufacturer to be used by the user or 
owner should be secure from dealer attack. Another 
example is delivery of a smart card to a user or a dealer 
may install malicious software on a mobile phone and sell it 
to a user. 
• Legal bodies (e.g., police): entities that enforce the 
legislations of government into a product, e.g., police and 
standards bodies. Suppose that a car has a digital 
identification or digital license plate. Its integrity is the 
police’s concern or the digital speedometer of trucks, for 
example, should not be manipulated by driver.  
• Beneficiary (e.g. bank): in some systems, in addition to user 
and manufacturer, there might be another entity that 
benefits from the usage of the system by its user. Like a 
bank that is the beneficiary of ATM machines. In our 
example, the taxi agency is the beneficiary of the cars. 
• Other systems: entities are not always human beings; they 
may be other systems which are a user or provider of 
services to the system. In our example, cars transmit safety 
messages to other cars. Integrity of these messages is a 
security concern. 
As one can see from this example, many entities are involved 
in the security requirements of an embedded system. 
Accomplishing all the security requirements of the various 
stakeholders is challenging. A strong security modeling is 
necessary to have a secure design leading to a secure product. 
6 Considering security from the 
beginning 
 In the literature, the need for considering security from 
the early stages of design has been emphasized [9, 10, 11]. 
Some initial efforts towards design methodologies to support 
security are described in [12, 13, 14, 15] but they don’t present 
a holistic approach as we intend to do in this paper. A sound 
approach to a secure design is to consider the security from the 
beginning. There should be an analysis of the life-cycle of the 
system to detect all the conceivable vulnerabilities and to have 
appropriate solutions for preventing those vulnerabilities or 
threats from happening. 
 Below the life-cycle of an embedded system is analyzed 
and possible sources of vulnerabilities in each step are 
explained. We call this strategy insecurity prevention. 
6.1 System Life-cycle 
 The life-cycle of an embedded system consists of three 
phases: development, use and disposal. 
 The development phase includes all activities from the 
requirement specification of a product to the decision that the 
system has passed all acceptance tests and is ready to be 
delivered. The development phase also consists of some sub-
phases such as: Requirement specification, Design, 
Production, Product shipment and Support/maintenance. 
 The use phase of a system’s life-cycle begins when the 
system is accepted for use and starts the delivery of its services 
to users. Use phase consists of alternating periods of correct 
service delivery, service outage, service shutdown and 
maintenance.  
 The disposal phase is the disposal of an embedded 
system including media, software, components and data stored 
on the device. It starts when the system is no longer used or it 
no longer delivers services. It can also be transferring of the 
system from one person to another. The disposal phase is 
essential to prevent inadvertent release of data, information, or 
software. Security consideration in this phase is beneficial to 
protect sensitive information from disclosure and adhere to 
copyright, statutory, and regulatory requirements. In this 
phase, if user is not going to use the system anymore and 
he/she discards it, the availability of the system is not of 
his/her concern, although if the system is transferred to another 
user, its availability is the new user’s concern. In disposal 
phase, the confidentiality and integrity of system and the data 
stored on it, is not less important to the user than in use phase. 
6.2 Sources of vulnerabilities in the Life-cycle 
 After analyzing the life-cycle of a system, we should 
think about the sources of vulnerability in each phase. All the 
entities involved in the life-cycle phases of an embedded 
system can be the reason of vulnerabilities and threats. 
Sources of the development vulnerabilities 
In the development phase, the physical world with its natural 
phenomena, developers who are lacking competence or having 
malicious purposes, development tools, production and test 
facilities/tools which are software and hardware used by the 
developers to assist them in the development process can be 
the source of vulnerabilities.  
Sources of use vulnerabilities 
In the use phase, the physical world, Administrators 
(authorized people), Service Users (limited authorized people), 
Service providers, Service infrastructure, other systems and 
adversaries are the sources of the vulnerabilities. Involved 
entities may lack competence or they may have malicious 
purposes. 
Sources of disposal vulnerabilities  
The disposal phase can be considered as a special case of use 
phase with the difference that in disposal phase, if the system 
is discarded, its availability is not a concern. Therefore 
availability vulnerabilities and threats are ignored in the 
security analysis. 
 The next step in life-cycle security analysis of embedded 
systems is to find the vulnerabilities originating from these 
sources and to apply solutions in the design methodology. In 
this paper, it is not discussed how safeguards are applied in the 
design methodology. 
7 4-Level defense strategy 
 To design a highly secure system, a 4-Level defense 
design strategy is proposed. This strategy consists of 
prevention, tolerance, removal and forecasting. Prevention and 
tolerance are basic security strategies while removal and 
forecasting are strategies for security assurance. Many 
applications need more than security, they need assurance, e.g. 
military equipments. 
7.1 Prevention 
 The first and the best strategy to create a secure system is 
insecurity prevention. Prevention means preventing the 
occurrence or introduction of vulnerabilities. Mostly this is 
done by solutions and techniques during the development of 
the system. Improvement of design and development methods 
can result in good strategies for preventing security 
vulnerabilities. We mentioned in section  6 a development 
technique for prevention in which security is considered from 
the beginning. 
 Although designers and developers do their best to 
prevent insecurity in the system, it is not guaranteed that the 
system will be absolutely secure during its use phase because it 
cannot be predicted fully where and how the system is going to 
be used. Therefore, we need to consider solutions for 
occasions when vulnerabilities were not detected or could not 
be detected during the development phase and possible attacks 
can happen. 
7.2 Tolerance 
 Tolerance means providing service in spite of some 
vulnerabilities or faults in the system. Different techniques can 
be applied towards tolerance.  We can categorize them into 
three categories: Vulnerability detection, Recovery and  Self-
adaptive techniques. 
Vulnerability detection 
In vulnerability detection, a mechanism is provisioned to 
detect possible vulnerability in a system. This detection can be 
done in two manners; concurrent detection and preemptive 
detection. Concurrent detection takes place during normal 
service delivery of system. For example, every file is checked 
for virus infection before execution. Preemptive detection 
takes place while the normal service delivery is suspended and 
the system is checked for faults and vulnerabilities e.g., during 
its idle time, the system is checked for existence of viruses.   
 However, detecting vulnerabilities is not the whole 
process of tolerance, after detecting we should handle these 
vulnerabilities. In fact we consider that there might be some 
vulnerability. We might detect them before becoming a threat 
to the system or we might not detect them and an attack could 
happen. Therefore, we should have strategies for both cases; 
handling detected vulnerabilities, handling threats or actual 
attacks. Vulnerability handling prevents vulnerabilities from 
being activated again. There can be different methods such as: 
Diagnosis, Isolation, Reconfiguration and Re-initialization. 
 After detecting vulnerabilities, we can collect and record 
information about the cause of the vulnerability for a future 
prevention or diagnosis. However, to prevent the utilization of 
a vulnerability and turning it into a threat for the system, we 
can isolate physically or logically the faulty component from 
the process of service delivery; in fact we make the 
vulnerability dormant. However, if we isolate a component of 
the system, we may need to switch to either a new redundant 
component or a spare one. This change in the system implies 
reconfiguring the system to have new consistent configuration. 
Also we may need to re-initialize the system and apply some 
changes in the tables and databases or configuration registry of 
the system. 
Recovery  
Still there is a probability that vulnerabilities were not detected 
and adversary used it and performed an attack. What we can 
do in case of an attack? In these cases we should have attack 
recovery. Depending on the attack, different strategies can be 
followed. Attacks on confidentiality may not be recoverable 
although they may be prevented in future designs. For attacks 
on data integrity, we can for example replace the data from the 
backup. The usual mechanism for attacks on availability is 
redundancy. For integrity and availability, techniques such as 
Rollback, Rollforward and Compensation can be applied. 
 Rollback is returning the system back to a saved state that 
existed prior to vulnerability detection; that saved state is a 
checkpoint. Compensation is replacing the redundant 
component to enable vulnerability elimination. Rollforward is 
setting the state without detected vulnerability as a new state. 
Self-adaptive techniques 
Some embedded systems are used in places where they should 
adapt themselves to the condition of their working 
surroundings. Also if they were attacked they should recover 
themselves automatically. In these situations, self-adaptive 
security techniques are very valuable. Having the ability to 
recover automatically requires provisioning re-configurability 
or re-programmability in the system. However existence of 
these facilities in the system might be the source of threats to 
the system. Self-adaptive techniques are challenging for 
security of embedded systems. 
 Vulnerability prevention and tolerance aim to make a 
system secure so that the system can deliver a trustworthy 
service. However, being secure is not enough and in high 
secure systems, we need assurance.  Vulnerability removal and 
forecasting are for assurance. They help to have confidence in 
the system by justifying that the functional and the 
dependability and security specifications are adequate and that 
the system is likely to meet them. 
7.3 Vulnerability removal 
 Vulnerability removal is performed both during the 
development phase and during the operational life of a system, 
i.e., the use phase. Vulnerability removal during the 
development phase of a system life-cycle consists of three 
steps: verification, diagnosis, correction. Verification is the 
process of checking whether the system adheres to given 
properties. If it does not, the other two steps follow: 
diagnosing the vulnerabilities that prevented the verification 
conditions from being fulfilled, and then performing the 
necessary corrections. After correction, the verification process 
should be repeated in order to check that vulnerability removal 
had no undesired consequences. 
 Verification techniques can be applied statically or 
dynamically. Verifying a system without actual execution is 
static verification, via static analysis (e.g., inspections or walk-
through), model-checking, and theorem proving. Verifying a 
system through exercising it constitutes dynamic verification. 
Verifying that the system cannot do more than what is 
specified, is especially important with respect to safety and 
security.  
 Vulnerability removal during the use phase is corrective 
or preventive maintenance. Corrective maintenance is aimed at 
removing vulnerabilities that have produced one or more 
threats and have been reported, while preventive maintenance 
is aimed to uncover and remove vulnerabilities before they 
might cause errors during normal operation. The latter 
vulnerabilities include a) physical faults that have occurred 
since the last preventive maintenance actions, and b) design 
vulnerabilities that have led to threats in other similar systems. 
Corrective maintenance for design vulnerabilities is usually 
performed in stages: the vulnerability may be first isolated 
(e.g., by a workaround or a patch) before the actual removal is 
completed. 
7.4 Vulnerability Forecasting 
 Vulnerability forecasting is conducted by performing an 
evaluation of the system behavior with respect to attack 
occurrence. Evaluation has two aspects: 
• Qualitative, or ordinal, evaluation, which aims to identify, 
classify, rank attacks, or the event combinations that would 
lead to system attack. 
• Quantitative, or probabilistic, evaluation, which aims to 
evaluate likelihood that a fault will exist or measuring the 
difficulty of an attack. 
Quantitative evaluations are better understood than the 
qualitative evaluations. For example, we can evaluate the 
amount of effort involved in breaking a cryptosystem. 
In security forecast we try to have an answer for questions such 
as: 
• How to predict security flaws and human misuse? 
• How to predict nature of attacks based on system assets and 
mission? 
• Which parts of system are likely to become under attack? 
• How to determine the nature of an attack in its early stages? 
• Is it an attack or not? What are its goals? How severe is the 
attack? 
These are the questions whose answers can help forecast the 
security of a system and the measure of assurance that we can 
have for it. Security forecasting is an area that needs further 
study. 
8 Conclusion 
 Security of embedded systems is very important. Strong 
security mechanisms prevent damages and economical losses 
while also offering new business opportunities. However, 
sound security solutions are not attained easily. There are 
many challenges that should be defied. Although security 
consideration as an afterthought seems to have short-term 
incomes and less development difficulties, one simple security 
breach in a product could result in deletion from the market. A 
sound solution considers the security from the beginning and 
analyzes the life-cycle of the system to detect the 
vulnerabilities from the birth to the death of system. After 
discovering the sources and the reasons of vulnerabilities, 
safeguards should be embedded in the design methodology. 
Although designers and developers try hard to prevent all 
conceivable attacks, since the use environments and behavior 
of users cannot be predicted, it is not fully guaranteed that the 
system is secure. In addition to prevention techniques, 
tolerance techniques applied in the system help to provide 
service in presence of failure or attack. Removal and 
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